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CORRESPONDENCE 
An Interested Response to a "Wholly Disinterested 
Assessment": LeBel on Summers on LeBel on 
Summers on . . . Er . . . Urn . . . 
Oh, Yeah . .. Fuller 
Paul A. LeBel* 
Now there ain't nobody nowhere nohow gonna ever understand me the 
way you did. 
- Bruce Springsteen 1 
In 1985, I published in the Michigan Law Review a review2 of a 
recent book by Professor Robert S. Summers on the legal philosophy 
of Lon Fuller.3 Professor Summers has published in the Cornell Law 
Review an ironically titled criticism of my review4 and of another re-
view. 5 In a number of respects, Professor Summers' Assessment has 
served to increase my understanding of his book, and I trust that other 
readers will be similarly benefited. Although Professor Summers' re-
sponse to my review of his book takes issue with what I said on a 
number of points, I strongly suspect that few readers would be inter-
ested in a detailed defense of what I said in that review. Such an exer-
cise is likely to be as unproductive to the participants and as 
incomprehensible to the reader as the "He said I said ... but what I 
really said was ... and anyway what I meant was ... and only an idiot 
would think that I meant ... " exchanges between gonzo historians 
that fill the back pages of the New York Review of Books. Several of 
the points that Professor Summers makes are worthy of some further 
attention, however, if for no other reason than that they demonstrate 
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B. 1971, George Washington Univer-
sity; J.D. 1977, University of Florida. - Ed. 
1. Springsteen, Bobby Jean (CBS Records, Inc. 1984) (title appears on Springsteen's Bom in 
the USA album). 
2. LeBel, Blame This Messenger: Summers on Fuller (Book Review), 83 MICH. L. REV. 717 
(1985). 
3. R. SUMMERS, LoN L. FULLER (Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory No.4, 1984). 
4. Summers, Summers's Primer on Fuller's Jurisprudence -A Wholly Disinterested Assess· 
ment of the Reviews by Professors Wueste and LeBel, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1231 (1986). 
5. Wueste, Fuller's Processual Philosophy of Law (Book Review), 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 
(1986). Professor Wueste responded to the concerns expressed by Professor Summers in Wueste, 
Morality and the Legal Enterprise- A Reply to Professor Summers, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1252 
(1986). 
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the contemporary significance of some very old debates. Among the 
topics on which the differences between my views and those recently 
expressed by Professor Summers might matter are first, the meaning of 
the question whether a judicial decision is good law, second, the un-
derpinnings of the morality characterization given to particular prac-
tices or goals within a legal system, and third, the significance of moral 
criticism. On each of these topics, I will give a very brief statement of 
how Professor Summers and I appear to differ, 6 and attempt to explain 
why the differences may be important. 
I. WHAT Do WE MEAN WHEN WE AsK "Is THAT Goon LAW"? 
Professor Summers asserts that I fail to grasp what lawyers mean 
when they ask whether a decision is "good law."7 Although he does 
not explain what lawyers do mean by that question, one can draw the 
inference that he thinks the question is a matter of substantive good-
ness "that draws heavily on moral ideas."8 There may well be occa-
sions when the words "good law" are used in such a way that the 
phrase has some connotation of substantive goodness. Without some 
special contextual suggestions to the contrary, however, it seems to me 
that the routine interpretation of the "good law" question would in-
stead indicate that it is primarily an inquiry about whether the deci-
sion is currently valid, in the sense of being capable of exerting some 
binding or persuasive effect on the decision of future cases. 
When performing any sort of serious linguistic analysis, one should 
be attuned to the ordinary way in which people, particularly profes-
sionals, speak. In this regard, a tin ear is as damaging to the linguistic 
philosopher as it is to the music critic. As I understand common pro-
fessional speech, substantive goodness would be questioned along the 
lines of whether a judicial decision is "a good case" or "a good rule" 
or "a good decision."9 In the situation in which the substantive good-
ness of a statute is at issue, the question is likely to be whether the 
statute is "a good law," which even more closely resembles the "good 
6. Professor Summers' Assessment contains a number of complaints about the way my review 
attributed to him positions that he does not hold. To the extent that I have misunderstood 
Professor Summers in any significant way, I can assure him that, however unskillful he may 
consider the execution to have been, my review was a good-faith attempt to identify weaknesses 
that I perceived in Lon L Fuller. It was not an effort to "trash" the book by attributing to him 
absurd positions that have no foundation in the book itself. 
7. See Summers, supra note 4, at 1248 n.76. 
8. Id. at 1248. 
9. To be accurate, one would need to distinguish between "a good case" and "a good rule" 
on the basis of whether the evaluation encompassed aU or only part of what the court had de-
cided. Such a degree of accuracy, I suspect, is more a matter of intuitive understanding and 
context than it is a result of conscious choice. 
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law" terminology. What these substantive goodness inquiries have in 
common is that in each instance the key term is preceded by an indefi-
nite article. The question about "good law," that is, one that lacks the 
indefinite article, is not a shorter version of the same question; it is a 
different question. 
Drawing the distinction between the two questions does not in any 
fashion commit' the questioner to the position of denying the impor-
tance of the substantive goodness question. It does, however, suggest 
the need for an explanation of why one would want to ask a legal 
validity question that is separate from, and arguably analytically prior 
to, the question of substantive goodness. From another perspective, 
one could ask what, if anything, is lost by interpreting the validity 
question as an inquiry about substantive goodness. Although I do not 
pretend to answer these questions as well as such scholars of jurispru-
dence as H. L.A. Hart, 10 I will attempt to indicate one of the major 
reasons why I think the distinction matters. 
When attempting to predict what a court will do in a particular 
dispute, a lawyer needs to understand more than the contemporary 
community mores with which a decision may or may not be in tune. 11 
In our legal system in which judges purport to operate under a rule of 
law that includes a doctrine of precedent, 12 a judicial decision can be 
understood to create a force that is analogous to resistance within an 
electrical circuit. 13 A lawyer striving for a specific result must recog-
nize that an unfavorable precedent may create a "resistance" that has 
an institutional character qualitatively different from the more explic-
itly economic, political, or ideological pressures for and against 
change. None of this is to deny that an idea "whose time ha[s] 
come" 14 will be better able to overcome the resistance of unfavorable 
precedent. Asking whether a decision is "good law" helps to highlight 
both the institutional nature of the precedential resistance that needs 
to be overcome and the special quality of the arguments against 
change that need to be anticipated and rebutted. 
The confusion that may be generated by imprecision in the use of 
10. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 204-07 (1961). 
11. I am assuming here that reference to conventional morality might produce a particular 
evaluation. A more likely scenario, I would suggest, is one in which conventional morality pro-
vides mixed signals about the substantive goodness or badness of a decision. This leaves aside the 
evaluation of a judicial decision according to a critical, nonconventional morality. 
12. A recent and highly illuminating jurisprudential essay on this subject is Schauer, Prece-
dent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). 
13. Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110-15 (1978) (distinguishing precedent's 
enactment force from its gravitational force). 
14. Summers, supra note 4, at 1247. 
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such terms as "validity,'' "acceptance," and "good law" is amply 
demonstrated by Professor Summers' examples in Lon L. Fuller and in 
his Assessment. To illustrate how the general acceptance and the ra-
tional appeal of a new legal rule are significant factors in determining 
its legal validity, 15 Professor Summers offers the example of a jurisdic-
tion's change from a rule that recognizes contributory negligence to a 
rule that determines liability on comparative negligence grounds. As 
support for the proposition that the quality of the content of a decision 
is an important part of the legal validity of that decision, he offers the 
rule adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey regarding the state-
of-the-art defense in asbestos products liability litigation - the 
Beshada rule. 16 Professor Summers' discussion of these two situations 
provides a useful case study on the need to keep separate ideas 
separate. 
In discussing his comparative negligence hypothetical, Professor 
Summers states that "the idea of comparative negligence was one 
whose time had come, and it was accepted by virtue of its content, not 
its source."17 I think Professor Summers is confusing some very dif-
ferent ideas here. The fact that an idea is one "whose time ha[s] 
come" is not a reliable indicator that a court will adopt it. One need 
only look superficially into the law of torts, for example, to find judi-
cial opinions agreeing that an idea's time has come but still refusing to 
adopt the idea. Nevertheless, I will accept Professor Summers' pre-
supposition that there is in fact language in the opinions of the court 
with competence to make the shift in legal _rules which can be identi-
fied as an indication that the shift is a desirable one that is on the way. 
In the terms of the metaphor introduced earlier, this type of judicial 
language can indicate that the resistance created by the precedent in 
favor of a contributory negligence rule is weakening. 
Professor Summers underemphasizes the significant fact that the 
shift from contributory negligence to comparative negligence is an ex-
ercise in making new law, that is, an exercise in innovation.18 The 
15. R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 50. 
16. Summers, supra note 4, at 1248 n.73. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 
N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products not permit-
ted to assert as defense to strict liability failure-to-warn claim the fact that they neither knew nor 
could have known that asbestos was dangerous when it was marketed). 
17. Summers, supra note 4, at 1247. 
18. But cf. R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE49-53 (1986) (legal decisionmaking is an exercise in 
creative interpretation). Professor Dworkin would say that my innovation description is accu-
rate, but only in a trivial sense. See id. at 6. One might say many things about the relative merits 
of contributory negligence and comparative negligence and about the wisdom of a court that 
adopts the latter rule. Nevertheless, until the court does so, the observation that the Jaw of the 
state is anything other than contributory negligence and that after the decision the law of the 
state is now different from what it was is certainly not trivial. A description of judicial decision-
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idea's attractiveness to the court with the competence to adopt it 
within a particular jurisdiction is much more likely to stem from the 
appeal of the idea's content than from the pedigree of the idea's ori-
gin, 19 but if that is all that is meant by an idea's being "accepted by 
virtue of its content, not its source," the point is so obvious as to be 
uninteresting. Professor Summers' statement does acquire meaning if 
we shift our focus from the action of the court making the (new) com-
parative negligence law to the reaction shown by some other group of 
people. With this new focus, we could inquire about the "acceptance" 
of the comparative negligence rule from the perspective of lower 
courts, of lawyers, or of the high court at a later date. It is in the 
context of this shift in perspective from the original enactment of a 
rule to its subsequent treatment that Professor Summers' example of 
the Beshada state-of-the-art defense becomes relevant. 
The question of "whether to give effect even to a very recently an-
nounced common-law rule"20 can be understood as a question of "ac-
ceptance" in two different senses. In a narrow sense, acceptance is a 
matter of the continued existence of the legal rule. In a broad sense, 
acceptance is a question of the extension of the rule. It is true that 
lawyers may criticize the new rule, and argue that it ought to be over-
ruled. If those arguments are successful and the decision is overruled, 
the common-law rule will no longer exist, and in that way it will have 
failed to be accepted in the narrow sense, that is, as a legal rule with 
continuing validity. An alternative way of depriving a decision of ac-
ceptance in the narrow sense would be the enactment of a statute set-
ting forth a contrary rule.21 
Professor Summers' Beshada example illustrates the second, or 
broad, sense in which a new rule might be said to run into problems 
with acceptance. The Beshada rejection of the state-of-the-art defense 
was, as Professor Summers correctly points out,22 severely criticized, 
making that depicts this particular situation as innovative in a trivial sense seems to me to have 
made a misstep at the outset, whatever that theory's merits might be in explaining and guiding 
other aspects of adjudication. 
19. On occasion, one court may appear to be following another court's decisions so closely 
that it is difficult to determine the extent to which the former is impressed by the ideas them· 
selves or the fact of their having been adopted by the other court. For an illustration of this 
relationship between the highest courts of Alaska and California, compare Caterpillar Tractor 
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), with Barker v. Lull Engg. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 
443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). This would not appear to be the situation contemplated by 
Professor Summers' statement. 
20. Summers, supra note 4, at 1248 (emphasis in original). 
21. A provision that would accomplish this result with regard to theBeshada state-of-the-art 
rule has been part of many of the federal products liability legislative proposals. See, e.g., S. 44, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5(e), 6(c) (1983). 
22. See Summers, supra note 4, at 1248 n.73. 
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but that criticism can best be understood as making the argument that 
the Beshada rule is not "a good rule." It is still important to realize 
that a heavily criticized decision can remain "good law" in the narrow 
sense of acceptance, and that Beshada in fact remains "good law" in 
New Jersey to this day.23 What Professor Summers ought to mean by 
his comment that "the court which had decided it more or less aban-
doned it as a precedent"24 is that Beshada is not currently considered 
by the court which adopted it to be "a good rule" outside of the spe-
cific setting of asbestos products liability.25 Saying instead that the 
decision is not "good law" addresses the question of legal validity, and 
that question needs to be kept separate from the question of "substan-
tive goodness or rightness"26 in order to maintain an accurate depic-
tion of the legal landscape. 
The Beshada rule also illustrates that the broad sense of acceptance 
as extension can proceed along two dimensions, doctrinal and spatial. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's refusal to extend the rule to a drug 
products liability case27 reflects the failure of the decision to achieve a 
broad doctrinal acceptance. A recent decision by the highest court of 
Maine not to adopt the Beshada rule in an asbestos case28 reflects the 
failure of the Beshada decision to achieve a broad spatial acceptance.29 
A linguistic analysis that fails to distinguish clearly between 
whether something is "good law" and whether something is "a good 
rule" is deficient for a number of reasons. First, it can fail to capture 
the institutional competence character of judicial responses to some 
arguments for change. An idea whose time has come may be thwarted 
by a judicial statement to the effect that, however much the court may 
agree that the suggested change is a good idea, the proper forum in 
which to advocate the change is the legislature. As long as courts seek 
to portray what they do as something other than purely or overtly 
political decisionmaking, a previous decision that is "good law" may 
very well serve to prevent a judicial move to what even the courts 
23. Recent authority continues to hold that in New Jersey asbestos products liability cases, 
the asbestos manufacturer will not be allowed to assert a state-of-the-art defense. See Prod. 
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 791 (Nov. 7, 1986) (discussing Meloni v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., No. 81-2542 (D.N.J. 1986)). 
24. Summers, supra note 4, at 1248 n.73. 
25. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has refused to extend the Beshada rule to a different 
type of products liability situation. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 
'(1984). 
26. Summers, supra note 4, at 1248. 
27. See note 25 supra. 
28. Bernier v. Raymark Indus., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986). 
29. Within the field of products liability, the decision that best exemplifies broad doctrinal 
and spatial acceptance is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
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might agree is "a good (i.e., better) rule." Second, the Beshada exam-
ple illustrates the role of a particular kind of advocacy when an attor-
ney encounters the resistance created by a recently enacted common-
law rule. One might easily have predicted when Beshada was decided 
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would be receptive to argu-
ments to limit the doctrinal scope of application of the Beshada rule, 
while nevertheless being skeptical that the court would make a com-
plete about-face so soon after deciding Beshada. When arguments for 
such a limitation are made, it might be said that the thrust of the argu-
ment is one that implicates the broad sense of "acceptance," so that 
the rule is not given an extended or expanded scope of application. 
Again, what needs to be recognized is the difference between these 
limiting arguments addressed to future judicial action and the separate 
question of the legal validity of the rule that has been adopted by a 
court with the power to bind lower courts. It is that difference that I 
fear is too easily obscured by the kind of description of legal validity 
that Professor Summers offers. 
II. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF A MORALITY CHARACTERIZATION 
One of the criticisms I suggested in my review of Professor Sum-
mers' book concerned the incompleteness of the account that he of-
fered of the moral base of a natural law theory. I attempted in my 
review to raise questions about the way legal philosophers of the natu-
ral law schools sometimes arrive at the morality characterization of 
the specific tests they wish to incorporate into the determination of 
legal validity. The example I used - the identification of an opportu-
nity to obey the law as the value that is served by the principles of 
Fuller's inner morality oflaw30 - involved a particular line of Fuller's 
argument of which Professor Summers' earlier writings had appeared 
to be critical and about which Lon L. Fuller seemed to express no 
reservations.31 This example was also meant to show how the reader 
would have benefited from a more carefully developed explanation of 
why Professor Summers has overcome his earlier reservations.32 In 
his book, Professor Summers identified a "fair opportunity to obey the 
law" as a moral value.33 I should have made it clearer in my review, 
when I questioned the steps by which that opportunity is character-
30. LeBel, supra note 2, at 723. 
31. See id. at 723-24. 
32. See id. at 721-23. Professor Summers acknowledged this point in his Assessment, and 
then took issue with Professor Wueste on the reasons supporting such a change. See Summers, 
supra note 4, at 1234-38. 
33. R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 37. 
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ized as a moral value, that I was not suggesting that Professor Sum-
mers' characterization necessarily fails unless he can set out a full-
fledged theory supporting it.34 Nevertheless, the way in which one 
views an opportunity to obey the law is a matter of some consequence. 
As I will try to show here, a mere statement that it is a moral value 
leave~ too many important questions unanswered.35 
The phrase "a fair opportunity to obey the law" is itself not free 
from ambiguity. A preliminary question that might be asked is 
whether any lack of an opportunity to obey the law is unfair or 
whether instead only some failures to provide such opportunities are 
unfair. If the latter, less ambitious assertion is what is meant, then a 
proponent of this particular standard of morality ought to explain how 
individuals and officials might distinguish between the fair and the un-
fair lack of an opportunity to obey. If instead the former, stronger 
point is being made, so that any lack of opportunity to obey the law is 
to be considered unfair, the notion of fairness that compels such a 
conclusion should be identified. Is an opportunity to obey the law a 
right? If so, what is its source? If it is a right, is it absolute or is it 
qualified in some way? Is an opportunity to obey the law important 
for instrumental reasons? If so, toward what goal does it aim and why 
is this the way to achieve that goal? In the absence of at least some 
discussion of points such as these, one simply does not know how Pro-
fessor Summers' particular value - an opportunity to obey - is to be 
understood in theory or in operation. This point may appear in the 
abstract to be fairly trivial, or not worth the effort I am suggesting. 
What needs to be recognized, however, is the key role that Professor 
Summers assigns to this point. It is the fair opportunity to obey the 
law that supplies the answer to the question of why Fuller's process 
values constitute an inner morality of law. "Because they provide a 
fair opportunity to obey the law" is no more satisfactory an answer by 
itself than is the even more cursory response, "Because they're fair." 
An example of why I think this matters may help to clarify my 
position. I set out above a strong and a weak version of the meaning 
34. But cj Summers, supra note 4, at 1239. Professor Summers is correct to point out that if 
I were to make the claim that fairness is not a moral value, I should be required to support or 
defend that claim. See id. at 1240. I did not, however, make such a claim. 
35. I do not suggest that fairness does not require an opportunity to obey the law, or that a 
legal system that completely ignores the provision of such an opportunity may be characterized 
as fair. There are, however, some significant practical questions that follow from the identifica-
tion of an opportunity to obey the law as the value that lends support to the "inner" moral 
character of a legal system. Unless Professor Summers is making the unlikely claim that there is 
only one way to view how and why the opportunity to obey the law is a necessary component of 
fairness, a critical step in the attempt to bolster the reader's understanding of Fuller's morality 
characterization seems to me to be missing. 
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of the assertion that fairness requires an opportunity to obey the law. 
Instead of there being only these two options, the meaning of the as-
sertion could range along a spectrum from the strongest to the weakest 
claim. Where one chooses to place the claim along that spectrum can 
have important consequences for the moral evaluation of a legal sys-
tem. A consideration of strict liability in tort will illustrate those con-
sequences. Suppose that a manufacturer of a machine used in an 
industrial process designs and constructs the machine in such a way 
that at all relevant times the manufacturer's conduct cannot be char-
acterized as negligent. In the two decades after the manufacture and 
sale of the machine, the law of negligence is supplemented with a doc-
trine of strict liability in tort that focuses on the safety of the product 
rather than the conduct of the manufacturer. Applying this strict tort 
liability, a court holds the manufacturer liable to an employee of a 
purchaser who is injured while using the machine. The stronger the 
claim about the fairness of an opportunity to obey the law, the more 
likely it is that this hypothetical case presents not only significant pol-
icy questions but substantial moral problems as well. 
When we actually look for the underlying theories of fairness or 
morality that might be used to determine the strength of the moral 
claim about an opportunity to obey the law, we find in practice both in 
our society at large and in the institutional materials of our legal sys-
tem not a single universally accepted theory of morality. Rather, we 
find a condition that Professor Dworkin refers to as a moral plural-
ism.36 As Professor Summers notes,37 the choice between social con-
tract theories of justice and utilitarian theories might produce 
conflicting answers to specific normative questions within a particular 
legal system. This situation creates the possibility that a particular 
value, such as an opportunity to obey the law, is both un-
derdetermined· and overdetermined by theories of morality. A particu-
lar moral theory might support any number of various schemes of law, 
including one in which an opportunity to obey the law plays a very 
weak role and is easily trumped by competing values. It might instead 
be the case that all theories of morality demand a legal system that 
gives a substantial weight to an opportunity to obey the law. If Profes-
sor Summers is arguing that an opportunity to obey the law is what 
gives the process values of Fuller their moral character, and that this 
moral character should be useful in evaluating current legal practices, 
it woul~ be helpful to know exactly what we are being asked to accept 
36. SeeR. DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 213. 
37. See notes 34-35 supra. 
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- a particular theory of morality or fairness, or an overarching state-
ment about morality or fairness that purports to give substantial 
weight to this opportunity under any particular theory. I do not mean 
to suggest that Professor Summers has no answers to these questions. 
Indeed, he begins to sketch his answers in his Assessment. My review 
and my response to his Assessment are intended to suggest that, with-
out considerably more careful and thorough explanation than was pro-
vided in Professor Summers' book, it is difficult to apply his 
characterization of Fuller's inner morality of law to the contemporary 
legal world. 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MORAL CRITICISM 
In my review of Professor Summers' book, I took one of his exam-
ples as an opportunity to question whether natural law thinking as-
signs morality a heightened role within the concept of legal validity. I 
drew attention to the disparity between the moral claim that he made 
regarding a right to a legislative hearing and the current practice of 
our legal system in which no such gei;leral right to a legislative hearing 
is recognized.38 In his response, Professor Summers demonstrates, per-
haps inadvertently, precisely what I feared was true, namely, that in 
assigning moral value issues a role within the determination of legal 
validity, the significance of moral evaluation can be trivialized. He 
suggests that I read him "to claim that parties potentially affected by a 
proposed law have a legal right to a legislative hearing," and thus that 
I appeared to charge him with an "appalling ignorance of the law. " 39 
Neither in my review nor here do I accuse Professor Summers of any 
such ignorance of the law. In fact, his vehement protest that he was 
"writing of moral values and moral rights!"40 rather than legal rights 
underscores the point I was raising. 
The kind of moral criticism that Professor Summers was making in 
Lon L. Fuller should be of some significance. He claims that parties 
affected by a proposed law have a moral right to a legislative hearing, 
although in our legal system those parties have no such legal right to 
that hearing. This disparity raises important questions about the role 
of moral criticism in determining legal validity. At the very least, one 
would expect a call for reform of the current legislative process, so 
that the recognition of this moral right could be incorporated into the 
legal system. But an attempt at such institutional reform would lead 
38. See LeBel, supra note 2, at 724. 
39. See Summers, supra note 4, at 1249 (emphasis in original). 
40. Id. at 1249 (emphasis in original). 
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us back to the same ambiguity that surrounds Professor Summers' ar-
gument about the fairness of an opportunity to obey the law.41 What 
is the strength of this particular moral value? Will other values out-
weigh the moral right to a legislative hearing? If so, which values and 
under what circumstances? Even more than in the case of the oppor-
tunity to obey the law, the identification of the moral theory support-
ing the right to a legislative hearing would be essential to an 
understanding of how one is to treat this moral claim. 
Suppose, however, that the more likely outcome of this call for 
reform is a refusal to incorporate a right to a hearing into the legisla-
tive process. What are the consequences of operating a legislative pro-
cess that has this moral imperfection? Is the process itself so flawed 
that nothing that issues from it can be in accord with a morally correct 
notion of a legal system? Are there instead more particularized inquir-
ies regarding the lack of a hearing on specific legislation that would 
determine whether the system as a whole has the "inner morality" 
necessary in a legal system? If only individual statutes are subject to 
question, what is the strength of the objection to their enactment? 
Does the process flaw call into question only the moral character of 
the statutes enacted without a hearing, or is their validity being ques-
tioned as well? 
Questions of this sort seem to me to be the natural consequences of 
the positions that Professor Summers has staked out. On some of the 
points on which he has criticized my review of his book, I hope that I 
have demonstrated that there is in fact no disagreement between us. 
As to the other points addressed in the three substantive sections of 
this response, I trust that I have raised a few points of disagreement 
with a sufficient degree of clarity so that the reader can understand 
what the disagreement is and why the resolution of those disagree-
ments might be a matter of some significance. 
41. See notes 30-37 supra and accompanying text. 
